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CASES NOTED

At present, arrests are still being made under the Florida vagrancy
statute. However, both Lazarus and the instant case are being appealed
to the United States Supreme Court. Hopefully, that court will lay the
abuses of Florida Statute section 856.02 to rest.
HAROLD G. MELVILLE

HEPATITIS AND STRICT LIABILITY
Plaintiff, a patient in defendant hospital, received several transfusions
of whole blood as part of a course of treatment. She developed serum
hepatitus which required further hospitalization. Her suit against the
hospital, sounding in strict liability in tort, was dismissed by the Circuit
Court of Cook County. On appeal, the Illinois appellate court held that
the complaint stated a cause of action and remanded the cause for trial.'
A certificate of importance was granted by the appellate court and the
cause was heard by the Supreme Court of Illinois which held: affirmed:
The doctrine of strict liability based upon sale of a defective product in
an unreasonably dangerous condition is applicable to an eleemonsynary
hospital which transfuses blood to a patient as part of its general services.
Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital, - Ill. 2d -, 266 N.E.2d
897 (1970).
The majority of cases involving blood transfusions have been based
on the theory of breach of an implied warranty, under first, the UNIFORMt
SALES ACT and, more recently, the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. The
leading case is Perlmutterv. Beth David Hospital.2 In that case, plaintiff
sought to recover on the theory that supplying blood was a sale within
the provisions of the SALES ACT and that, consequently, a warranty that
the blood was reasonably fit for the purpose intended was implied from
the sale. In a four-to-three decision, the New York Court denied recovery,
holding that the contract between the hospital and the patient was one
for services-not for the sale of goods-and was not divisible into sale
and service components. 8
The conclusion is evident that the furnishing of blood was only
an incidental and very secondary adjunct to the services performed by the hospital and, therefore, was not within the provisions of the Sales Act.4
The majority of the reported cases are in accord with the Perlmutter
decision.5 However, some courts have differentiated between a hospital
1. Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 113 Ill. App. 2d 74, 251 N.E.2d 733 (1969).
2. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
3. Id. at 104, 123 N.E.2d at 794.
4. Id. at 106, 123 N.E.2d at 795.
5. Accord, Whitehurst v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 1 Ariz. App. 326, 402 P.2d 584
(1965); Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Center, Inc., 23 Wis. 2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1064);
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and a blood bank in applying the sales-service distinction. These courts
have found a contract for services when a hospital was the defendant and
a contract for the sale of goods in cases involving commercial blood
banks.0 In Carter v. Inter-Faith Hospital of Queens,7 a New York court

held that under the

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,

a blood bank was a

merchant, and thus an implied warranty of merchantability could attach
to a sale of its goods. The court concluded that such cause of action for
breach of implied warranty would lie against a commercial blood bank
although not against a hospital. 8 Many states, including Florida, have by
statute declared that the sale of whole human blood for the purpose of
transfusions shall be considered a service.' These statutes make it unnecessary for the courts to resolve the issue.
In deciding how to apply the sales-service distinction, several courts
have been cognizant of, and influenced by, the lack of a definitive test to
determine the presence of hepatitis virus in the blood, and that such blood
should therefore be considered an unavoidably unsafe product. These
arguments have been raised as defenses to recovery based on implied
warranty. Some courts have felt that if the action could be maintained at
all, the hospital or blood bank would be liable regardless of the fact that
the virus could not be detected. 10 Others have held exactly the opposite,"
and one court has recently declared the issue must be resolved at trial
where all the evidence could be fully developed.' 2
A recent Pennsylvania case"3 has rejected the sales-service distinction,
Dibblee v. Dr. W.H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 12 Utah 2d 241, 364 P.2d 1085 (1961);
Goelz v. J.K. & Susie L. Wadley Research Institute & Blood Bank, 350 S.W.2d 573 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1961). Contra, Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879
(1967), rev'd on other grounds, 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1968).
6. Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So.2d 749, 752 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966),
aff'd as modified on other grounds, 196 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1967) held:
Regardless of the fact that a hospital supplying whole blood to a patient may be
merely performing a service incident to the over-all medical attention being furnished, we are not willing to extend this "service" characterization to the blood bank
which originally collects and distributes the commodity. It seems to us a distortion
to take what is, at least arguably, a sale, twist it into the shape of a service, and
then employ this transformed material in erecting the framework of a major policy
decision.
White v. Sarasota County Public Hosp. Bd., 206 So.2d 19 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968), cert. denied,
211 So.2d 215 (Fla. 1968); Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So.2d 205 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
7. 60 Misc. 2d 733, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
8. Id. at 734, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
9. FLA. STAT. § 672.316(5) (1969) ; ALASKA STAT. § 45.05.100 (1968) ; CALIF. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1606 (1971); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-316(5) (1965). The Florida
statute was adopted after Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 196 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1967),
presumably to overrule the result of that case.
10. Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp,. 308 N.Y. 100, 106, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954). This
was one of the important factors that led the court to find that a service was involved. See
also, Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 196 So.2d 115, 119 (Fla. 1967) (Roberts, J.,
specially concurring).
11. Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879, rev'd, 53 N.J. 138,
249 A.2d 65 (1967).
12. Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp., 429 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867 (1970). Accord, Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 196 So.2d 115, 118 (Fla. 1967).
13. Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp., 439 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867 (1970).
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holding that a cause of action does exist based on the alleged breach by
the hospital of the implied warranty of merchantability or the implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. The court reasoned that the
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE does not impede the development of implied
warranties in non-sale cases, 14 and stated:
We therefore do not feel obligated to hinge any resolution of the
very important issue here raised on the technical existence of a
sale. 15
Even if it were decided that supplying whole blood for transfusions was a
service, the Pennsylvania court refused to hold that recovery was impossible without a trial where a complete record could be established on
the issues.' 6
In the instant case, the action was brought on the doctrine of strict
tort liability rather than the theory of implied warranties. 7 Although at
least one court had previously held that the governing principles and
remedy under either theory are identical,'" the Illinois Court attacked
the problem anew. The court analyzed the issue of whether the doctrine
of strict tort liability, as set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS' 9
and as adopted in Illinois by Suvada v. White Motor Co.,"0 attached to a
hospital supplying whole human blood to its patient for the purposes of
a transfusion.
After finding that whole blood fit the definition of "product" as
stated in the RESTATEMENT, 21 the court went on to analyze the saleservice distinction relied upon by Perlmutter and the cases following it.
The court stated, however, that it did not consider the public policy basis
of Perlmutter relevant to its decision:
14. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, comment 2.
[Tihe warranty sections of this article are not designed in any way to disturb those
lines of case law growth which have recognised that warranties need not be confined either to sales contracts or to the direct parties to such a contract.
15. Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp., 439 Pa. 501, 503, 267 A.2d 867, 870 (1970).
16. Id. at 504, 267 A.2d at 871.
17. Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 113 Ill. App. 2d 74, 251 N.E.2d 733
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Cunningham].
18. Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 324, 232 A.2d 879, 884 (1967).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].

(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although

(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
20. 32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
21. RESTATEMENT, Comment e:
Normally the rule stated in this Section will be applied to articles which already
have undergone some processing before sale, since there is today little in the way of
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[T]here can be no question that defendant is engaged in the
business of "selling" whole blood for transfusion into patients
as that 2 requirement is contemplated under our ruling in
Suvada.

In failing to accept the reasoning of the Perlmutter majority,2 the court
also saw no distinction between a hospital and blood bank2 4for the purpose
of the imposition of liability based on the RESTATEMENT.
The court then considered an additional problem raised by earlier
cases, 2 the problem of the effect of the impossibility of discovering the
defect in blood and the unavoidably unsafe product exception to the rule
of strict tort liability. 6 Both were rejected as possible defenses to liability.27 As to the former the court held that:
[W]hether or not defendant can ...

ascertain the existence of

serum hepatitus in whole blood employed by it for transfusion
purposes is of absolutely no moment. Any other ruling would be
entirely inconsistent with the concept of strict tort liability.2"
In discussing the related problem-whether blood should be considered an
unavoidably unsafe product as contemplated in the RESTATEMENT's exception to strict liability,29 the Illinois Court held that the exception
applied only to products which are not by their nature impure but which
even if properly prepared, would involve substantial risk to the user. For
consumer products which will reach the consumer without such processing. The rule
is not, however, so limited, and the supplier of poisonous mushrooms which are
neither cooked, canned, packaged, nor otherwise treated is subject to the liability
here stated.
22. Cunningham, Ill. 2d -,
266 N.E.2d 897, 902 (1970).
23. The Illinois Court saw no difficulty in separating the contract for services from
that of the purchase and sale of the healing materials. Id. at -,
266 N.E.2d at 901.
24. In denying the existence of a difference between the hospital and blood bank for
the purposes of liability, the court relied on comment f of section 402A of the RESTATEMENT.
The rule stated in this Section applies to any person engaged in the business of
selling products for use or consumption. . . It is not necessary that the seller be
engaged solely in the business of selling such products.
It found that although a blood bank's principal function is to stockpile blood for distribution to various institutions, while a hospital generally provides blood as only an ancillary
part of its services, both entities were clearly within the distribution chain. Cunningham, Ill. 2d at -,
266 N.E.2d at 901.
25. Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp., 439 Pa. 501, 503, 267 A.2d 867, 870 (1970); Jackson
v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 329, 232 A.2d 879, 886 (1967); Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc.,.185 So.2d 749, 755 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
26. RESTATEMENT, Comment k.
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite
incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use.... An outstanding
example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly
leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the
disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use
of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of
risk which they involve....
27. Cunningham, Ill. 2d -,
-,
266 N.E.2d 897, 903 (1970).
28. Id. The impossibility of detection has previously been held not to bar recovery in
an implied warranty case where the plaintiff contracted typhoid fever after eating contaminated clams. Kenower v. Hotels Statler Co., 124 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1942).
29. See note 26 supra.
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example, the Pasteur treatment for rabies, even though properly prepared,
may involve serious consequences to the consumer, but because the disease
leads to a dreadful death, the use of the vaccine is justified. On the other
hand, blood with hepatitus virus is impure, and it is this impurity, rather
than the product itself, that makes it unreasonably dangerous. Such blood
is in a defective condition and calls for the application of strict liability."0
The foregoing cases involve the resolution of a policy decisionwhether it is preferable for the hospital or for the individual to bear the
risk of loss when serum hepatitis results from a transfusion of contaminated
blood. The instant case chose to place the burden of the loss on the
hospital3 and made a very convincing application of the doctrine of
strict tort liability in support of the decision. Other courts will be called
upon for their decisions, and they now have available two theories on
which they can base it-that of implied warranties and the one offered
in this case of strict liability in tort, with its freedom from the limitations
32
of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE.
The Illinois Court could have chosen to follow Perlmutter and find
that there was a service. The view that a sale was involved seems, however, to be the more realistic view. Also, the court could have utilized the
RESTATEMENT exception and declared blood an unavoidably unsafe product. However, it is the opinion of this writer that the court chose the
better interpretation of the RESTATEMENT exception.
While it is true that there is as yet no definitive way to detect hepatitis virus in whole blood, the possible imposition of liability may cause
the blood banks, both hospital and commerical, to take more care in the
selection of their donors."3 That hospitals often depend for blood on
commercial banks is not sufficient cause to immunize the hospitals from
liability, since under these circumstances the hospital could itself maintain an action against the commercial blood bank. The hospital would
also be in a better position to pressure banks into using the utmost care.
The decisive factor in determining where to place the burden of responsibility was that the hospital is better able to anticipate and bear the risk
of loss than is the injured individual. For precisely this reason, the
Ill. 2d -,
-, 266 N.E.2d 897, 904 (1970).
31. The court stated that it did not believe that
hospital immunity can be justified on the protection-of-the-funds theory. The concept of strict liability in tort logically, and we think, reasonably, dictates that an
entity which distributes a defective product for human consumption, whether for
profit or not, should legally bear the consequences of injury caused thereby, rather
than allowing such loss to fall upon the individual consumer who is entirely without
fault. Id.at -, 266 N.E.2d at 904.
30. Cunningham, -

32. RESTATEMENT, Comment m:

The rule stated in this Section is not governed by the provisions of the Uniform
Sales Act, or those of the Uniform Commercial Code, as to warranties; and it is
not affected by limitations on the scope and content of warranties, or by limitation
to "buyer" and "seller" in those statutes.
33. Many blood banks pay for each donation, and, as there are some who are lax in
their investigation, it is conceivable that a single donor could go from one to another for a
ready source of income. However, it is precisely these people, many of whom are narcotic
addicts, who are most likely to be carriers of hepatitis virus.
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state legislatures will be under pressure from hospitals and their insurers to initiate legislation to prevent such imposition of liability. The
Florida legislature was under this sort of pressure after the decision in
Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc.,34 and a statute effectively overruling that decision resulted.a5
JUDITH FINKEL RINSKY

HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF AND THE CONCURRENT
SENTENCE DOCTRINE
The petitioner, who was serving concurrent sentences for convictions of robbery and uttering a forged instrument,' sought to have the
robbery conviction set aside on the ground that his right of appeal from
the conviction had been thwarted. Petitioner contended that he had requested his privately retained attorney to file a motion for new trial and
notice of appeal; however, his attorney had advised him that he had
been retained for trial work only and that if he wished for an appeal to
be taken, a separate fee would have to be paid. Since this fee was not
paid, the attorney never filed the motion for a new trial or notice of
appeal.2 After an unsuccessful attempt to have the judgment vacated,8
petitioner then petitioned the Florida Supreme Court for a writ of habeas
corpus. The respondent argued that the writ could not be issued because
Florida recognized the concurrent sentence doctrine which precluded
issuance of the writ when the petitioner attacks only one of the sentences
he is serving. Held: A prisoner serving concurrent sentences may use
habeas corpus to attack the one sentence while still serving the other
34. In Russell v. Community Blood Bank, 196 So.2d 115 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966), it was
held that the supply of blood from a commercial blood bank was a sale and consequently, a
cause of action was allowed for breach of an implied warranty.
35. The legislature then adopted FLA. STAT. § 672.316(5) (1969), which declared that
any procurement or distribution of blood for transfusions is "the rendering of a service by
any person participating therein, and does not constitute a sale, . . . and the implied warranties of merchantability . . . shall not be applicable. . . ." This effectively overrules the
result of Russell and takes the blood bank out of the scope of liability based on implied
warranty.
It is conceivable that a legislature might pass a similar statute declaring that blood shall
not be considered an unreasonably dangerous product for the purposes of the imposition of
strict tort liability, and thus avoid the result of the principal case.
1. Petitioner, James D. Frizzell, was incarcerated under two sentences for a term of
ten years.
2. This alleged error was first raised and considered on a motion to vacate under FLA.
R. CRm. P. 1.850. The circuit court denied the motion and, on appeal, the District Court
of Florida, Second District, affirmed, holding that in a collateral post-conviction proceeding
a defendant cannot seek reversal for what his privately retained counsel failed to do. Frizzell v. State, 213 So.2d 293 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
3. Id.

